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Abstract: Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism purports to show that moral evaluation of human 
action and character is an of evaluation of natural goodness—a kind of evaluation that applies to 
living things in virtue of their nature and based on their form of life. The standard neo-Aristotelian 
view defines natural goodness by way of generic statements describing the natural history, or the 
‘characteristic’ life, of a species. In this paper, I argue that this conception of natural goodness 
commits the neo-Aristotelian view to a problematic anti-individualism that results in the wrong 
assessment of individuals with uniquely adaptive adjustments. I then offer an alternative account 
of natural goodness that avoids this problem. Instead of relying on generic statements about a 
species, my account defines natural goodness based on counterfactual conditionals describing the 
modal properties of a single individual. I argue that this modal-explanatory account gives a 
conception of natural goodness that is more intuitively plausible and better suited to capture the 
diversity and plasticity distinctive of life. 
Keywords: Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism. Natural Goodness. Natural History. Individualism. 
Teleological Explanation. Invariance.  
1 Introduction: Virtue as Natural Goodness  
According to neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism, moral evaluation of human action and character 
shares a conceptual structure with evaluations of goodness and defect in other living things, 
including plants and animals. Foot (2001), Hursthouse (1999), and other proponents of the view 
argue that moral goodness is an instance of natural goodness in human beings, where natural 
goodness denotes a kind of evaluation that applies to living things and their parts and aspects in 
virtue of their nature and based on their form of life. Thus, neo-Aristotelians argue that moral 
virtue in human beings is akin to the deep root of an oak tree. In the same way that deep roots are 
naturally good in an oak tree because they enable it to flourish qua oak, moral virtues like justice 
and benevolence are naturally good in a human being because they enable her to flourish qua 
human. 
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The first step in defending neo-Aristotelian naturalism is giving an account of natural 
goodness. Foot (2001) characterizes natural goodness as a form of evaluation that is exclusively 
attributable in the case of living things, and evaluates their parts and aspects based on standards 
determined by their form of life. She argues that almost anything can be evaluated in a context that 
sufficiently relates it to human concerns. But evaluations of natural goodness are distinctive in 
that they are intrinsic: they apply to the parts and aspects of living things independently of the 
interests of humans or any other external party. They only depend on the relation of an individual 
organism to its own form of life (2001, p. 27). What is naturally good in the life of oaks is good 
not because of how we happen to evaluate them, but simply because of the nature of the organism 
itself. Thus, evaluations of natural goodness are based on standards that are constitutive of a form 
of life. Given the nature of oaks as heavy trees, having deep and sturdy roots is constitutive of 
what it is to flourish qua oak. Similarly, neo-Aristotelians argue, given our nature as self-conscious 
human beings with a particular form of practical rationality, moral virtue is constitutive of what it 
is for us to flourish qua human being.  
Neo-Aristotelian naturalism has been subject to ardent critical discussion. One prominent line 
of objection questions whether evaluations of natural goodness can be at the same time compatible 
with modern evolutionary biology and suitable for giving an account of moral virtue. Critics appeal 
to an evolutionary account of biological function and human life to question whether substantive 
virtues like justice and benevolence are instances of natural goodness in human beings (Fitzpatrick, 
2000; Andreou, 2006; Millgram, 2009; Millum, 2006; Woodcock, 2009; Lewens, 2010; 
Odenbaugh, 2017). Neo-Aristotelians respond, however, that this objection relies on a mistaken 
interpretation of their view, where natural goodness is reduced to evolutionary biological 
functioning. They argue that natural goodness is based on a different notion of function—distinct 
from that of a biological adaptation—that is at the core of conceptualizing living things as living 
(Hacker-Wright, 2009; Lott, 2012a). The natural good of a kind of organism captures the 
characteristic way of life and flourishing of the organism, which cannot be deduced from the facts 
of evolution. Particularly in the case of human beings, since the characteristically human way of 
life involves the exercise of practical reason, forming the right conception of human nature requires 
an understanding of the norms of practical reason (Lott, 2012b). This is why empirical studies of 
our evolutionary history are not enough to give us an account of natural goodness in human beings.  
3 
 
It’s worth noting that neo-Aristotelian naturalism, construed in this way, is different from 
reductive forms of ethical naturalism in that it is compatible with the epistemic autonomy of 
ethics.1 In other words, it is not an ambition of the neo-Aristotelian view to offer a derivation of 
substantive moral virtues from non-evaluative, independently-recognizable facts. Arguably, it’s 
the task of normative theory to work out the right substantive conception of human flourishing and 
moral virtue. What the view offers is rather an account of moral virtue in terms of an already 
evaluative conception of human nature, which nonetheless places morality on a par with evaluative 
patterns found in the lives of animals and plants. By presenting an account of moral goodness as 
natural goodness, neo-Aristotelians aim to show that moral evaluation is an instance of a familiar 
type of evaluation that we frequently make and accept in the case of non-human living things. 
Thus, they aim to show that moral goodness is not “a special kind of non-natural property” (Foot, 
2001, p.6), but rather continuous with the natural domain of life.2  
While I am sympathetic to the neo-Aristotelian project, I will argue that the conception of 
natural goodness that is at the core of the most paradigmatic forms of the view is in need of 
 
1 This is, roughly, the thesis that non-ethical evidence (such as evidence from biological sciences) is not relevant 
to the epistemic justification of “pure”, or “non-mixed”, ethical claims. (see Maguire, 2017, for a more precise account 
and discussion of various types of autonomy). Note that neo-Aristotelian naturalists have frequently pointed out that 
their view preserves the autonomy of ethics from biology (see Thompson, 2004, p. 72; Lott, 2012b, p. 418-421). 
2 Of course, in order to fully defend this view, neo-Aristotelians need to show that at least some evaluations of 
natural goodness in the case of plants and animals are objectively true and correctly represent the nature of reality. 
This is a claim that has been contested, particularly because neo-Aristotelians insist that the natural good of an 
organism cannot be reduced to evolutionary fitness. Some critics have argued that the neo-Aristotelian notion of 
natural goodness is part of an outdated conception of living things that should be rejected in light of the scientific 
account given by evolutionary biology (see Fitzpatrick, 2000; Odenbaugh, 2017). Neo-Aristotelians respond, 
however, that evolutionary biology is only concerned with explaining certain aspects of living things—namely their 
evolutionary history—and does not offer a satisfactory account of the nature of living things as living. They argue that 
accounting for the nature of living things as living requires presupposing an evaluative conception of their way of life, 
which commits us to the notion of natural goodness. See Hacker-Wright (2009, pp. 316-317), Lott (2012a, pp. 374-
375), and Moosavi (2019) for promising attempts to defend the neo-Aristotelian concept of natural goodness against 
this objection. 
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revision. Foot fleshes out her account of natural goodness further and specifies that evaluations of 
natural goodness are based on the characteristic life of the species to which an organism belongs. 
In doing so, she relies on Thompson’s (1995; 2008) account of the characteristic life of a species, 
or—to use Thompson’s term—a life-form. On Thompson’s account, members of a life-from share 
a natural history that can be represented in generic statements describing the characteristic 
elements, aspects, and phases of their kind of life. The natural history of the oak life-form, for 
instance, can be described in statements such as “oak trees have deep roots”, “they produce acorns 
in the fall”, and so on. This natural history then sets the standards for evaluating the parts and 
aspects of instances of the life-form as naturally good or defective. Thus, what explains the fact 
that the deep roots of the oak tree in my back yard are naturally good, on this view, is the natural 
history of the oak life-form.  
The resulting natural-historical understanding of natural goodness is the focus of this paper. 
Although neo-Aristotelians typically use ‘natural goodness’ as synonymous with the Foot-
Thompson understanding of natural goodness in terms of natural history, I will draw a distinction 
between the general concept of natural goodness as an intrinsic and constitutive evaluation of 
living things based on their form of life, and the specific, natural-historical conception of this 
concept presented by Foot and Thompson. My aim is to argue that the natural-historical account 
is neither the only possible account of natural goodness nor the most plausible one. I will propose 
an alternative account of natural goodness that makes no reference to the natural history of a life-
form, and I will argue that it fares better than the natural-historical account in capturing intuitions 
regarding intrinsic and constitutive evaluations of living things. So, from here on, I preserve the 
term ‘natural goodness’ for the general concept of an intrinsic and constitutive evaluation of living 
things based on their form of life; and I use ‘natural-historical goodness’ or ‘the natural-historical 
account of natural goodness’ to refer to the specific account of this concept given by Foot and 
Thompson.3  
 
3 It’s worth noting that giving an account of natural goodness is worthwhile regardless of whether the neo-
Aristotelian metaethical project will succeed. Even if it turns out that moral virtue is in fact not an instance of natural 
goodness, it would be helpful to understand what natural goodness is. It’s a concept that seems to be at the core of 
understanding the nature of life, and is potentially relevant for giving an account of other important concepts such as 
welfare, health, and disability. 
5 
 
In what follows, after a more in-depth discussion of the natural-historical account, I argue that 
this account leads to the wrong assessment of a class of individuals whose uniquely adaptive 
adjustments set them apart from other members of the species to which they belong. I argue that 
this problematic outcome results from the fact that the natural-historical account is committed to 
anti-individualism—roughly, the thesis that the standards of natural goodness are not determined 
by lower-level facts about the individual organism itself. This is an aspect of the neo-Aristotelian 
view that has not been critically discussed. I argue that the commitment of the natural-historical 
account to anti-individualism is both problematic and unnecessary. I then propose an alternative 
account of natural goodness that does not share this commitment and hence can avoid the 
mischaracterization of individuals with uniquely adaptive adjustments.  
2 The Natural-Historical Account of Natural Goodness  
Let’s have a closer look at the natural-historical account. As I mentioned above, on this account, 
the standards for evaluating the parts and aspects of a living organism depend on the natural history 
of its life-form. The concept of a life-form, which is introduced by Thompson (1995; 2008), is 
defined in terms of a particular form of thought that we use in relation to the domain of life. This 
form of thought is manifested in the kind of generic descriptions that we typically encounter in a 
nature documentary or a field guide—statements such as “the bobcat has four legs” or “cherries 
bloom in spring”. Thompson calls these statements natural-historical judgments. The general form 
of natural-historical judgments is something like “the S is/has/does F”, “Ss are/have/do F”, or “an 
S is/has/does F.” Thompson argues that natural-historical judgments have a distinctive form of 
generality that is neither universal nor statistical. They articulate the characteristic elements, 
aspects, and phases in the life of a kind of living thing. But they are neither universal 
generalizations about all instances nor statistical generalizations about most instances of the kind. 
The truth of a natural-historical judgment about life-form S is consistent with some or even most 
instances of S not matching the description expressed in the judgment. For instance, “the bobcat 
has four legs” can be true even if most bobcats lose one of their legs in an accident. According to 
Thompson, what we can infer about such non-conforming instances is that there is something 
defective about them: a bobcat with only three legs is defective in that it doesn’t have four legs. In 
this way, natural-historical judgments provide a basis for evaluations of natural goodness and 
defect. The natural history of a life-form, which is captured by the set of true natural-historical 
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judgments about the life-form, determines what is naturally good or defective in the life of 
members of the life-form. 
A few clarifications about natural-historical judgments are in order. Although these judgments 
are generics, not every generic judgment is a natural-historical judgment. Broadly speaking, 
generic judgments pick out patterns of regularity that characterize instances of a kind; but they 
don’t necessarily underwrite inference to evaluative judgments. “Minnesota winters are cold”, for 
instance, is a generic judgment that doesn’t underwrite evaluative inferences: a mild winter in 
Minnesota wouldn’t necessarily be so bad. If natural-historical judgments are to underwrite 
evaluative inferences, they need to be more than mere generics. In fact, on Thompson’s account, 
natural-historical judgments meet several other criteria beside genericity.  
First off, natural-historical judgments have a teleological character. Thompson describes 
natural-historical judgments as a specific subclass of generics that are “teleologically articulable” 
(2008, 79). This means that natural-historical judgments can be connected with each other in 
teleological relations. Take, for instance, “the bobcat hunts at dawn and dusk”. As a natural-
historical judgment, this statement can be connected with another natural-historical judgment 
about bobcats, e.g., “the bobcat stalks prey with stealth”, such that we can say: “the bobcat hunts 
at dawn and dusk in order to stalk prey with stealth”. This natural teleological judgment describes 
a teleological relation between two aspects of the life-form, where one is characterized as a means 
toward the other. Note that “Minnesota winters are cold” does not have this teleological character, 
which is why it is not a natural-historical judgment. Natural-historical judgments identify 
characteristic aspects of the life-form that serve a purpose and can be described a means toward 
other characteristic aspects of the life-form.  
Moreover, each natural-historical judgment about a life-form must be teleologically related to 
other natural-historical judgments not just as a means, but also ultimately as an end. “The bobcat 
hunts at dawn and dusk”, for instance, describes a characteristic activity that is not only a means 
toward further ends such as stalking prey, but also an end toward which other aspects of the life-
form such as having sharp eyesight are a means. We can say: “the bobcat has sharp eyesight in 
order to hunt at dawn and dusk”, to describe a teleological relation in which hunting at dawn and 
dusk appears as an end. To see why having the teleological relation in the reverse direction is 
necessary, consider a breed of domestic sheep raised for their wool, on which shearing is regularly 
practiced. Suppose that unlike wild sheep that only grow enough wool for protection from cold, 
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this breed of sheep grows so much wool that it needs to be sheared to avoid overheating. Although 
it might be true that “the sheep has short wool in summer”, this is not a true natural-historical 
judgment about this domestic breed of sheep, even if having short wool serves a purpose in the life 
of the sheep.4 The reason is simply that having short wool is not an end toward which any other 
characteristic aspect of the sheep is a means.  
Lastly, natural-historical judgments are different from generic statements about artifacts and 
crafts, which also have a teleological character. Artifactual judgments like “cars have a carburetor” 
and “cars burn fuel” can be teleologically connected. But these judgments do not describe life-
forms, and they cannot be the basis for evaluations of natural goodness. As we saw earlier, 
evaluations of natural goodness are intrinsic—they apply to parts and aspects of living things 
independently of the interest of humans or any external party. In the case of artifacts and crafts, 
although we can evaluate their parts and mechanisms, the basis for evaluation is ultimately 
something about us. Cars are ultimately for our transportation, and if we evaluate a car’s carburetor 
based on how it enables the car to burn fuel, this evaluation is not independent from our own ends 
and interests. To distinguish natural-historical judgments from artifactual judgments, Thompson 
suggests that the truth of teleological judgments about artifacts “presupposes that someone makes 
or has made the corresponding judgment, or at least some others belonging to the same system of 
judgments” (2008, p. 80). It simply cannot be true that “cars have a carburetor in order to burn 
fuel” unless someone has made this judgment or at least some other judgment regarding cars. In 
contrast, natural-historical judgments can be true without anyone knowing about them or making 
any kind of judgment about the life-form they describe. In fact, as Thompson points out, 
unrecognized life-forms are common.  
To sum up, the statement “the S is/does/has F” is a true natural-historical judgment about life-
form S, describing natural-historical characteristic F, if and only if: 
(1) Genericity: “The S is/does/has F” is a true generic. 
(2) Teleology: There is a natural-historical characteristic of S, G, such that “The S is/does/has 
F in order to be/do/have G” is a true generic. There is also a natural-historical characteristic 
of S, H, such that “The S is/does/has H in order to be/do/have F” is a true generic. 
 
4 Note that failure to have short wool—say, due to lack of shearing—would not be a defect in this breed of sheep, 
even if it would be disadvantageous.  
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(3) Independence: The truth of natural teleological judgments about S does not presuppose 
that anyone makes these judgments or any other judgments about S. 
Now, the teleological connective in condition (2) needs further clarification. The way 
Thompson conceives of the connective, it is simply used to organize the elements of a natural 
history, without having anything to do with “the category of intention and psychic teleology” 
(2008, p. 78). Natural teleological judgments articulate the relations of dependence that hold 
among the elements and aspects of a given life-form. They specify which elements and aspects of 
a life-form provide the conditions required for other elements and aspects to arise. In Thompson’s 
words, the teleological connective “simply expresses the concept that is converse to this 
conception of dependence” (2008, p. 79). So, the judgment “the bobcat hunts at dawn and dusk in 
order to stalk prey with stealth” simply expresses that stalking prey with stealth depends on 
hunting at dawn and dusk. 
It may seem as though this dependence relation among the elements of a natural history can 
be interpreted as a mere causal dependence relation. On this interpretation, “The S is/does/has F 
in order to be/do/have G” simply means that F and G are two characteristic features of life-form 
S, where F causes G. However, this interpretation would make the natural-historical account 
inadequate as an account of natural goodness. If all that is required for a generic statement to be 
teleologically connected to another generic statement was that they describe aspects of a kind that 
are causally linked, many non-living kinds would be the subject of true natural-historical 
judgments. Volcanoes, for instance, can be described by generic statements such as “volcanoes are 
formed when magma from the earth’s upper mantle comes to the surface” and “volcanoes erupt 
when pressure builds up”.5 Moreover, the characteristic features and phases described in these 
generic statements causally depend on each other. In fact, geologists talk about the ‘life-cycle’ of 
a volcano, describing the stages volcanoes go through as they form, become active, erupt, and 
become extinct. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to evaluate volcanoes as good or defective 
based on how well they exhibit this characteristic life-cycle. The causal dependence relation 
between the different stages that they go through does not amount to a teleological relation of the 
right type, and it would be misleading to say things like “volcanoes are formed in order to erupt”. 
 
5 Note that these statements will remain true even if as a result of climate change volcanoes do not always exhibit 
this pattern perfectly. 
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For natural-historical judgments to serve as the basis for evaluations of natural goodness, the 
dependence relation among the elements of a natural history cannot be interpreted as a mere causal 
relation. The relevant notion of teleological dependence implies that the characteristic feature 
described in a natural-historical judgment contributes to something that is a genuine good of the 
life-form. What is missing in the case of volcanoes is that the contribution of the characteristic 
elements and stages of the system cannot be plausibly viewed as good, which is why the causal 
dependence relations that they instantiate do not amount to the relevant kind of teleological 
relation. Thus, the truth of “S is/does/has F in order to be/do/have G” requires not only that F 
causally contribute to G, but also that F and G are good in the life of S.   
Incorporating this interpretation of the teleological dependence relation in our conditions (2) 
and (3) above, the truth conditions for natural-historical judgments can be articulated as follows. 
The statement “the S is/does/has F” is a true natural-historical judgment about life-form S, if and 
only if: 
(1) Genericity: “The S is/does/has F” is a true generic. 
(2) Teleology: “The S is/does/has F in order to be/do/have G” and “The S is/does/has H in 
order to be/do/have F” are true generics, where G and H are natural goods in S.  
(3) Independence: The truth of natural teleological judgments about S does not presuppose 
that anyone makes these judgments or any other judgments about S. 
It is worth noting that Foot’s discussion of the teleological dimension of natural-historical 
judgments actually suggests a similar interpretation of teleology. In her discussion of what she 
sees as “a gap” in Thompson’s account, Foot argues that in order to support inference to 
evaluations of natural goodness, natural-historical judgments must describe a feature that serves a 
function, or plays a part, in the life characteristic of the life-form. What counts as “the life” of a 
kind of living thing, however, is understood in terms of essential goods such as survival and 
reproduction. Foot believes that for plants and non-human animals, “the life” characteristic of the 
life-form has to do, directly or indirectly, with development, self-maintenance, and reproduction. 
In her view, a statement like “the blue tit has a blue patch on its head” does not support inference 
to evaluative judgments, because the color of the head plays no part in any of these aspects of “the 
life” of the bird. In the case of human beings, of course, essential goods go beyond this list and are 
much more diverse. In fact, one could argue that even in the case of non-human living things, there 
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can be essential goods other than the three goods that Foot considers.6 But regardless of what 
exactly the goods of a given kind of living thing consist in, it’s important to see that the teleological 
dependence relations expressed in condition (2) have to be understood in terms of these goods. In 
Foot’s words, for any element of the natural history, we must be able to ask: “what’s the point of 
it?” and “what good does it do?” (Foot, 2001, pp. 30-31). Unless a feature makes a characteristic 
contribution toward a good, it does not have a place in the natural history of the life-form.  
Now we are finally in a position to articulate the natural-historical account. We saw that on 
this account, natural-historical judgments are the basis for evaluations of natural goodness, such 
that a given feature in an organism is naturally good if and only if it matches the characteristic 
feature expressed in a true natural-historical judgment about the individual’s life-form, and it is 
naturally defective when it doesn’t so match. Thus, the natural-historical account can be 
formulated as follows: 
For any individual organism x that is an instance of life-form S, being/doing/having F is a 
natural good if and only if:  
(1) Genericity: “The S is/does/has F” is a true generic statement. 
(2) Teleology: “The S is/does/has F in order to be/do/have G” and “The S is/does/has H in 
order to be/do/have F” are true generics, where G and H are natural goods in S. 
(3) Independence: The truth of natural teleological judgments about S does not presuppose 
that anyone makes these judgments or any other judgments about S. 
There are a few things to note about this account. First, since the teleological component of 
the natural-historical account cannot be understood without presupposing an evaluative conception 
of “the life” of living things, the account does not offer a reduction of natural goodness. Purely 
non-evaluative criteria such as patterns of genericity or relations of causal dependence are not 
enough to determine the natural good of a life-form on this account. We rather need to presuppose 
an already evaluative conception of “the life” of a given kind of organism before we can identify 
the natural-historical judgments that are the basis evaluations of natural goodness. Thus, the 
account does not amount to a definition of natural goodness unless it is coupled with basic 
assumptions about at least some natural goods in the life of a given life-form.  
 
6 Hursthouse, for instance, considers enjoyment and freedom from pain among the characteristic goods in the 
life of sentient animals (1999, p. 200). 
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However, the fact that the account does not reduce natural goodness in non-evaluative terms 
does not mean that it is uninformative or that it contributes nothing to our understanding of natural 
goodness. As mentioned earlier, neo-Aristotelian naturalism does not aim to offer a derivation of 
substantive moral virtues from non-evaluative facts. It rather aims to give an account of moral 
virtue in terms of an already evaluative conception of natural goodness in human beings, which 
nonetheless shows moral evaluation to be an instance of a familiar type of evaluation that 
characterizes plants and animals. The natural-historical account describes this familiar type of 
evaluation in non-reductive, yet informative terms. Although the account does not provide a 
straightforward derivation of natural goods from independently-recognizable facts, it does guide 
our theorizing once we have some plausible background assumptions about the goods of the 
organism. More specifically, it identifies genericity as a necessary condition for natural goodness, 
which informs how we interpret the background assumptions when applied to the specific case of 
an organism.  
To see how the natural-historical account informs our theorizing, suppose we start with the 
plausible assumption that survival or self-maintenance is a natural good in the life of plants and 
animals.7 It’s easy to see that this general idea is not enough to determine the specific parts and 
aspects that are naturally good in a given kind of organism. Almost any feature or aspect of an 
organism might contribute to survival under the right conditions, but we don’t consider just any 
contribution to survival as an instance of natural goodness, and we don’t consider just any failure 
to contribute to survival as an instance of natural defect. For example, a particular arrangement of 
fur on a tiger’s face might discourage a hunter from shooting the tiger if the shape of fur happens 
to remind him of his mother’s face.8 But we do not thereby evaluate this fur arrangement as 
naturally good. The natural-historical account explains why the fur arrangement does not qualify 
 
7 As mentioned earlier, Foot considers self-maintenance to be a good in the life of plants and animals, which is 
not to say that it is the only good or the ultimate good in their life. The good of self-maintenance has to be balanced 
against other goods in the life of the organism and achieved by its characteristic way of life. On Foot’s account, for 
plants and non-human animals, the list of natural goods also includes reproduction and development. For human being, 
the elements that make up a good life are more diverse and interdependent, and are characteristically achieved by 
exercising practical reason (Foot, 2001, p. 42).  
8 This example is adapted from Lott (2012b, p. 371). 
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as a natural good by appealing to patterns of genericity: it’s neither characteristic of tigers to have 
fur arrangements of this particular shape, nor characteristic of such fur arrangements to contribute 
to a tigers’ survival. In contrast, a tiger’s sharp eyesight or the ability to run fast not only contribute 
toward the tiger’s survival, but also do so systematically and characteristically, by enabling the 
tiger to engage in other characteristic behaviors such as hunting prey. We can make true generic 
statements, saying “tigers run fast” or “tigers run fast in order to hunt prey”. On the natural-
historical account, this is why characteristics like running fast and having sharp eyesight are 
naturally good in the life of a tiger and lacking them is a defect. In this way, the account offers a 
basis for interpreting the parts and aspects of living things and making specific evaluations in view 
of general assumptions about the goods.9  
3 Natural-Historical Evaluations and the Problem of Anti-Individualism  
The natural-historical account has a lot of initial appeal. We do typically use generic judgments to 
describe and understand living things, and many instances of such judgments—e.g., cats having 
four legs, owls seeing in the dark, etc.—seem intuitively plausible. We also seem to rely on these 
judgments in making evaluations of individual organisms and what goes well or poorly in their 
life. However, although we find these judgments intuitively plausible, there is a question whether 
they are more than useful approximations or rules of thumb that we employ in our folk 
understanding of living things. Even if there is a sense in which many of our generic judgments 
about living things are true, it is not obvious that they provide a basis for evaluations of the right 
kind. Note that to provide a basis for evaluations of natural goodness—i.e., the kind of intrinsic 
evaluation that is constitutive of living things—natural-historical judgments need to identify 
aspects of a kind of organism that capture its nature as a living thing. It’s not enough for these 
judgments to be merely true of a kind of living thing: it has to be essential to grasping its nature. 
My contention is that although in a great many cases natural-historical judgments do identify 
 
9 It should be noted that although I have used the good of survival as an example to demonstrate how the natural-
historical account helps our theorizing, the account (as formulated above) is not tied to this or any other general 
assumptions about the natural goods. The background assumptions about the goods that are coupled with the natural-
historical account need to be independently plausible, and it is no part of the neo-Aristotelian view that they can be 
simply derived from the facts of evolution. 
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aspects of living things that can underwrite evaluations of natural goodness, this is not always the 
case. Here, I introduce a class of cases where the natural-historical account does not capture what 
intuitively seems to be the right intrinsic assessment of a living organism. 
Consider the judgment “goats have four legs”, which is a good candidate for a true natural-
historical judgment about goats. Not only is having four legs a characteristic feature that is 
generally observed in goats, it plays a role in other aspects of the goats’ natural history such as 
how they stand and how they walk. According to the natural-historical account, this natural-
historical judgment implies that a goat without four legs is naturally defective, which is an 
assessment that intuitively seems plausible in the case of most goats without four legs. However, 
consider now the real-life case of a two-legged goat described in 1942 by morphologist E. J.  
Slijper. West-Eberhard (2005) writes about this goat in her discussion of the role of developmental 
plasticity in the origin of species differences. This goat was born without forelimbs, but it adapted 
to its condition in unexpected ways. It developed several behavioral and morphological 
specializations similar to those of kangaroos and other bipedal mammals, including enlarged hind 
limbs, a curved spine, and an unusually large neck. As a result, the goat learned to hop around 
using its hind legs alone. As West-Eberhard’s points out, the correlated shift in the goat’s 
morphology and behavior led to “the well coordinated production of a complex and individually 
advantageous adjustment, producing a novel phenotype with little or no genetic change” (2005, p. 
6545). The goat lived for a year before it died in an accident unrelated to its physical condition. 
Let’s call this goat ‘Hopper’ to signify its unique way of moving around. I will argue that the case 
of Hopper presents a challenge to the natural-historical account. Since Hopper did not have four 
legs, the natural-historical account evaluates this goat as naturally defective. But given that the 
goat seems to have been able to manage perfectly well without four legs, it’s not clear why we 
should accept this evaluation.10   
One might try to defend the natural-historical evaluation of Hopper by arguing that even 
though the goat could hop on two legs, its way of movement was not as effective as normal goats. 
It seems plausible that a goat that hops on two legs would not be able to get around as fast or as 
easily as normal goats running on four. However, note that regardless of whether this was in fact 
 
10 For further discussion of Slijper’s goat, see Amundson (2000, p. 39-40). Amundson uses this example to argue 
against the legitimacy of the concept of normal function in biology.  
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the case with Hopper, the natural-historical account is not sensitive to how fast or easily a two-
legged goat can move around. Even if Hopper was able to move with the same speed and ease as 
ordinary goats, the account would evaluate it as defective due to its difference in how it moves. 
What makes “goats have four legs” a true natural-historical judgment and a basis for natural-
historical evaluation is that having four legs is a characteristic feature of goats that 
characteristically contributes to other characteristic aspects of their life like movement and finding 
nutrition. Even if Hopper could realize these other characteristic aspects of a goat’s life with only 
two legs, its way of achieving them would not be the characteristic way.  
Moreover, even if as a matter of fact Hopper was slower than other goats, it is not obvious 
that this difference in speed should constitute a defect. Presumably, ordinary four-legged goats 
also vary in their speed depending on other factors like their size. Unless Hopper’s slowness is 
debilitating and restrictive, it seems arbitrary to consider its relative slowness as a defect. Note that 
the natural-historical account does not consider ordinary goats defective for falling short of the 
speed exhibited by other species like cheetahs and lions. Even if the ability to run as fast as a lion 
would be an advantage in the life of a goat, the account does not evaluate all goats as naturally 
defective or naturally worse-off than faster species. And this is for a good reason: natural goodness 
is an evaluation of living things based on standards internal to their own form of life; not based on 
what would have been optimal or ideal for them. A cheetah’s ability to run fast or an eagle’s ability 
to fly would be external and irrelevant standards for evaluating a goat. Similarly, a four-legged 
goat’s ability to run with a certain speed seems like an external and irrelevant standard for 
evaluating Hopper. Given that Hopper diverges significantly from ordinary goats in its 
morphology and method of locomotion, it seems to merit a different standard of evaluation based 
on its own modified form rather than the form of other goats. 
Note that the problem with the natural-historical assessment of Hopper is not merely that it 
misidentifies the legs as defective, but also that it fails to identify the good of many aspects of the 
goat’s morphology. Hopper had a dorsoventrally compressed ribcage, a swayed back, and dorsally 
located clavicles and scapulae, which together enabled the goat to keep its upright posture and 
walk on two legs. Any of these features would likely be a defect in ordinary goats, but in Hopper, 
they made a crucial contribution to the goat’s achieving movement and maintaining its way of life. 
It seems plausible to consider the presence of these features in Hopper as naturally good, and their 
loss as a defect. The natural-historical account, however, is not able to make any such assessment. 
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It treats all the peculiar aspects of Hopper as instances of natural defect in the same way that it 
treats them as defect in ordinary goats.   
Proponents of the natural-historical account might respond by contesting my original 
assumption that “goats have four legs” is a true natural-historical judgment. They might argue that 
once we encounter the case of Hopper, we need to revise this judgment, because we learn that 
having two legs is also an acceptable way for goats to be. They might suggest, for instance, that 
we could accommodate the case of Hopper by simply weakening our initial natural-historical 
judgment to something like “goats have at least two legs”. However, it’s easy to see that this 
revision won’t help, because the resulting standard of evaluation would be overly permissive. The 
judgment “goats have at least two legs” implies that having only two legs is acceptable in any goat, 
regardless of whether the goat has made the distinctive developmental adjustments observed in 
Hopper. So, it would fail to capture the fact that having only two or three legs constitutes a defect 
in an ordinary goat.  
A more promising strategy for accommodating the case of Hopper would be to argue that 
the life-form goat consists of two sub-kinds that have different characteristics and can be described 
in different natural-historical judgments. Polymorphism—the occurrence of multiple distinct 
phenotypes in the population of a species—is a commonly observed phenomenon among living 
things. And there is no reason to think that the natural-historical account cannot handle 
polymorphism. When there are different sub-kinds within a life-form, natural-historical judgments 
can be articulated in such a way that they specify different characteristics based the sub-kind to 
which their instances belong. So, my opponent could argue that upon encountering Hopper, we 
can recognize a new sub-kind of goats—bipedal goats—which differ from other goats not only in 
the number of their legs but also in various other characteristics like the shape of their spine and 
how they move. We can describe this sub-kind in natural-historical judgments such as “bipedal 
goats have two legs,” “have a curved spine,” “move by hopping around,” while making different 
natural-historical judgments about quadrupedal goats. In this way, the natural-historical account 
can avoid mischaracterizing Hopper as defective without offering a standard of evaluation that is 
overly permissive for other goats.  
However, although dividing a life-form into different groups makes sense in the case of 
established sub-kinds that are observed regularly among the members of the life-form, it won’t 
help to address the problem if the alternative form is unique to a single individual. If the case of 
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Hopper is unprecedented and unique among goats, it’s not clear why we should accept “bipedal 
goats have two legs” as a true natural-historical judgment. There is no reason to think bipedalism 
marks a sub-kind of goats as opposed to a merely accidental feature of Hopper. Remember that the 
natural-historical account relies on generic patterns observed among members of a life-form to 
distinguish between characteristic and accidental aspects of an organism. As we saw earlier with 
Lott’s example of the tiger whose face resembles a hunter’s mother’s face, not just any trait that 
contributes to a good in the life of an organism is a characteristic trait. The natural-historical 
account does not consider the arrangement of fur on the face of Lott’s tiger to be characteristic of 
tigers, because the trait is not observed with any sort of regularity among tigers. “Cute-faced tigers 
have faces that resemble the face of a human female” is therefore not a true natural-historical 
judgment about a sub-kind of tigers. But by the same token, if the adaptive adjustment enabling 
Hopper to hop on two legs is unique to Hopper, we have no grounds for viewing bipedalism as a 
characteristic aspect of a sub-kind of goats. And in the absence of such grounds, the natural-
historical account is committed to evaluating Hopper based on the same standard that applies to 
normal, four-legged goats.  
This problematic implication of the natural-historical account results from its commitment to 
the rejection of a position that Thompson calls individualism. In his discussion of the concept of 
life, Thompson (2008) rejects the idea that whether an individual entity amounts to a living thing 
and whether its parts and processes amount to organs and vital operations is determined by lower-
level facts about the region of space-time occupied by the individual. Instead, he argues that the 
representation of the individual as a living thing depends on the ‘wider context’ of its life-form, 
which goes beyond the individual and “is not fixed or determined by anything in the individual 
itself” (2008, pp. 50-51). As we saw earlier, Thompson defines a life-form as a special sort of kind 
or category that can be the subject of a natural-historical judgment (2008, p. 48). And for the 
reasons I explained with the example of Hopper, this conception of a life-form implies that the 
form of life of a living thing is characteristically shared between multiple instances of the life-
form, which excludes the possibility of life-forms with only one instance. As Thompson puts it, 
although it may not be a priori that “a life-form must have (or have had or be going to have) more 
than one bearer”, we know of no other way for life-forms to be realized in nature as we know it to 
be (2004, n. 10). I take it that this is because we know of no other way to distinguish between 
characteristic and accidental aspects of the life of an organism. A class of individuals that are 
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linked via reproduction realizes patterns of regularity that underwrite generic judgments describing 
the characteristic aspects of their life. But with merely a single individual, and in the absence of 
supernatural grounds such as a theological theoretical framework, there just isn’t anything that can 
underwrites generic, natural-historical judgments. In the case of a swamp creature appearing as a 
result of a cosmic accident, for instance, Thompson argues that even if it is a molecule-for-
molecule replica of Thompson himself, we cannot view it as an instance of the human form or any 
other life-form. That is because without any connection to human beings or other life-forms, there 
is no wider context for assessing the individual, and it is underdetermined how its parts and aspects 
should be understood. It’s underdetermined, for instance, whether the part that is the molecular 
equivalent of Thompson’s left arm is really an arm or, say, a horribly deformed wing (2008, pp. 
60-61). 
To sum up, the natural-historical account gives an anti-individualist conception of natural 
goodness, according to which the standards of evaluation are not determined by lower-level 
properties of a single individual, and rather depend on patterns of regularity realized across 
multiple individuals sharing the same life-form. This means that an individual organism cannot be 
subject to a standard of natural goodness that is not shared by any other actual organisms. And I 
have argued that this requirement results in making the wrong assessment of individuals with a 
unique form. It should be noted that although I have focused on one illustrative example with the 
case of Hopper, the development of unique forms as a result of developmental plasticity is by no 
means a rare occurrence among living things. In fact, West-Eberhard argues that “the two-legged 
goat effect” is a widespread phenomenon (2003, p. 53). Developmental plasticity—the ability of 
organisms to change in response to external or internal environmental inputs during their 
development—is a distinctive feature of living things that plays an important role in originating 
evolutionary novelty. When a new phenotype arises as a result of genetic or environmental input, 
the plasticity of living organisms enables them to respond by developing other novel and highly 
adaptive phenotypes via phenotypic accommodation—the adaptive adjustment of various 
phenotypes in the organism to accommodate the new phenotype. If the genetic or environmental 
factor initiating the change is recurrent, the new phenotypes will spread and ultimately get 
genetically accommodated via natural selection. But clearly, whether a novel phenotype in a given 
organism is naturally good or defective does not have to depend on whether the phenotype gets 
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spread in the population later. And we have seen that the natural-historical account is unable to 
identify an adaptive novel phenotype as naturally good unless it is multiplied across the species.  
4 Toward an Alternative Account of Natural Goodness 
My aim in the rest of the paper is to offer an alternative account of natural goodness that avoids 
the problematic commitment of the natural-historical account to anti-individualism. I will sketch 
a novel account that does not rely on generic judgments about a life-form, and instead grounds the 
distinction between goodness and defect in explanatory generalizations that describe an individual 
organism. In a nutshell, my account determines whether a part or an aspect of an organism is 
naturally good or defective based on the best explanation of the organism’s various parts and 
aspects. In offering this account, I draw from Walsh’s (2012; 2013) approach to teleological 
explanation. As we will see below, Walsh defends the status of teleological explanation as 
scientifically respectable by identifying a distinct kind of regularity in the modal profile of a 
purposive system that is empirically observable and explanatorily significant. In the next section, 
we will see how my account appropriates this distinct kind of regularity as a basis for evaluations 
of natural goodness. But let’s start with an overview of Walsh’s account first. 
A teleological explanation explains the occurrence or the nature of some event or entity by 
citing the goal, end, or purpose to which it contributes. Despite the prevalence of teleological 
notions in biology, they are often considered problematic and associated with the pre-Darwinian 
view of life as the product of God’s conscious design. As Walsh (2012; 2013) points out, modern 
scientific methodology is predominantly mechanistic. On the mechanistic worldview, every 
natural phenomenon has a productive cause, and to explain the phenomenon one adverts to the 
causal mechanisms that produce the phenomenon. Moreover, causal-mechanistic explanations are 
considered to be in principle exhaustive and complete: they apply to the occurrence of every event, 
and once completed, they leave no unexplained residuum. Because of this, contemporary 
philosophy of biology often tries to naturalize teleological explanations by offering a translation 
scheme that presents teleological explanation as a cryptic form of causal explanation.11 However, 
 
11 This usually involves citing natural selection as the causal mechanism that accounts for the explanatory role 
of function ascription. The selected-effect accounts of function (Millikan 1989; Neander 1991, Godfrey-Smith 1994), 
for instance, interpret the function of a trait as the effect for which past occurrences of the trait have been selected. 
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Walsh argues that teleological explanation is a legitimate, non-redundant form of scientific 
explanation that is not reducible to causal explanation and captures a distinct kind of regularity in 
the world. On his view, for some events, fully understanding their place in the natural world 
requires that they are explained “twice over: once by appeal to the mechanisms that cause them 
and once by appeal to the purposes they subserve” (Walsh 2012, p. 174).  To defend the status of 
teleological explanation as a distinct and legitimate form of scientific explanation, Walsh appeals 
to a prominent account of causal explanation given by Woodward (2001; 2005).  
According to Woodward, giving a causal explanation of a phenomenon requires identifying 
a set of conditions that make the difference between its occurrence and its non-occurrence. This 
involves identifying the phenomenon as part of what he calls an invariance relation, which is 
essentially a robust relation of counterfactual dependence between two states or events. A relation 
is invariant or stable across certain changes if it holds—up to some appropriate level of 
approximation—across those changes. If xc is genuinely a cause of xe, we would expect the 
generalization describing how changes in xc are correlated with changes in xe to be invariant under 
at least some change in xc (Woodward, 2005, p. 239).12 This means that, for a range of 
circumstances, if we were to intervene to change the value of xc, the value of xe would also change 
in a systematic way, such that the generalization describing the relation between xc and xe would 
continue to hold.13  
 
They then appeal to the historical efficacy of natural selection to capture how functions explain the existence or 
prevalence of their function-bearers: the current occurrence of the functional trait is causally explained by the effect 
of the previous occurrences of the trait which gave the bearer a selective advantage. 
12 More accurately, we would expect them to be invariant under some interventions on xc, where an intervention 
on xc with respect to xe is a change in the value of xc that changes xe, if at all, only via a route that goes through xc and 
not in some other way. 
13 We can see that this is the case for Newton’s law of universal gravitation. The generalization F = Gm1m2/r 2 
describes the relation between the magnitudes of two masses m1 or m2, the distance d between them, and the value of 
the gravitational force they exert on each other. Not only does this generalization hold for the actual values of the 
variables in a given instance, it also continues to hold in a range of counterfactual circumstances under variations in 
the value of m1, m2, d, or F. 
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Woodward argues that a generalization relating xc and xe that is invariant in this way enables 
us to explain xe in terms of xc. The explanation shows how changes in explanandum 
counterfactually depend on changes in the factors cited in the explanans, i.e., how the explanandum 
would have been different if the factors cited in its explanans had been different.  
Importantly, this account of explanation does not limit explanatory generalizations to what 
are often regarded as laws of nature. The invariance relation does not require that the generalization 
describing the relation between the two states is exceptionless or that it meets other traditional 
criteria for lawfulness such as breadth of scope and theoretical integration. All that is required for 
a generalization to be invariant is that it is stable under some range of interventions.  
According to Walsh (2012; 2013), just as a relation of counterfactual dependence holds 
between a cause and its effect, a distinct relation of the same form holds between a goal and the 
means to its attainment. On Walsh’s view, although Woodward’s invariance relation—which we 
may call causal invariance—always holds between a cause and effect, when the effect is also a 
goal and the cause is a means to attaining that goal, there is an additional invariance relation 
between the two, which holds in the reverse direction and underwrites a teleological explanation 
of the means in terms of the goal. Walsh (2015, p. 198) calls this additional invariance relation 
purposive invariance. He argues that while the causal invariance relation captures the 
counterfactual dependence of an effect on its cause, the purposive invariance relation captures the 
counterfactual dependence of cause (as a means) on the effect (as a goal).  
We can see the difference between these two patterns of counterfactual dependence in an 
example. Suppose you are walking in a market when you notice that a store actually carries sweet 
lemons, a childhood favorite that you have had a hard time finding anywhere in town. Happy with 
this incident, you buy some lemons.14 Now, contrast this scenario with a different case where you 
already know that the store carries sweet lemons and you go to the market specifically to buy some 
lemon from the store. Although in both cases you buy sweet lemons as a consequence of going to 
the market, the patterns of counterfactual dependence are not the same. Both cases get the same 
causal explanation. In both cases, buying lemons is causally explained by going to the market. 
This is because the relation between going to the market and buying lemons exhibits causal 
 
14 Walsh discusses a similar example adapted from Aristotle’s Physics II.5 involving a man collecting 
subscriptions for a feast (Walsh, 2015, p. 193). 
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invariance and continues to hold under certain changes in the conditions of your going to the store. 
For instance, if you had gone to the market wearing something else, you would still have bought 
the lemons. Or if you had gone to the market a little earlier in the day, you would have bought the 
lemons a little earlier in the day. However, in the second case, there is also a different invariance 
relation that supports additional counterfactuals. For instance, in the second case, if lemons were 
kept somewhere in the back not immediately noticeable to someone walking in the market, you 
would still have bought some. Perhaps even if it was another store carrying sweet lemons you 
would have gone to the other store instead and would still have bought them. Or if you were busy 
during the day and worried that the store might run out of lemons before you could walk there, 
you would have driven your car to the market instead. This additional pattern of invariance, which 
is absent in the first case, is due to the fact that in the second case there is a means-end relationship 
between going to the market and buying lemons. On Walsh’s account, this different pattern of 
invariance underwrites a distinct form of explanation that is teleological explanation. And that is 
why, in the second case, we can explain your going to the market by pointing out that you go there 
in order to buy sweet lemons.  
According to Walsh, the purposive invariance relation between a goal xe and a means xc 
exhibits stability under two kinds of changes. First, the relation between xc and xe is not disturbed 
by at least some changes in the initial conditions. Under a range of conditions, as long as xe is a 
goal, xc will occur as a matter of regularity such that xe occurs as a result. Second, under a range of 
conditions, if the goal xe is changed to xe*, the means would correspondingly change, to xc*, such 
that the new value of the means is conducive to the new value of the goal (Walsh 2013, p. 52). In 
the example discussed above, we can see these two patterns of stability in the counterfactual 
condition in which you are too busy to walk to the market and the one in which a different store 
carries the lemons respectively. Since your action of going to the market is directed toward the 
goal of buying lemons from the store, under certain conditions—e.g., being busy during the day—
you would adjust your action—e.g., by driving instead of walking—such that you would still buy 
the lemons. Similarly, if certain aspects of your goal—e.g., which stores the lemons are to be 
bought at—change, you would adjust your action—e.g., by going to a different store instead—
such that you would still buy the lemons.  
As we can see above, Walsh’s account of purposive invariance makes reference to the notion 
of a goal. But it’s worth noting that, in offering an account of teleological explanation, Walsh is 
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not concerned with giving an account of what it is for something to be goal-directed, but is rather 
trying to identify the aspects of goal-directness that make it explanatory. Here, we may simply 
understand goals based on the notion of goal-directedness in Cybernetics and Systems Theory 
(Rosenblueth, Wiener, & Bigelow, 1943; Bertanlanffy, 1969; Braithwaite, 1964; Nagel, 1961; 
1977; Sommerhoff, 1950).15 On this account, having a goal is a complex, empirically observable 
property of a goal-directed system that results from the system’s architecture and causal capacities. 
A goal-directed system is, roughly, a system that has the capacity to attain and maintain an end-
state in the face of external and internal perturbations. When changes in the external or internal 
environment threaten to deflect the system from this end-state, the system typically alters its 
behavior in a way that redirects the system toward this state. The stable end-state is the system’s 
goal. Since goal-directed systems don’t always maintain their goal states successfully, the account 
only requires that the system oscillates around its goals or approaches them asymptotically. Thus, 
goal-directedness can be characterized in terms of behavioral signs such as persistence and/or 
plasticity. Persistence involves maintaining the end-state across a wide range of conditions; and 
plasticity means doing so by responding differently to conditions and in a manner appropriate to 
attaining the end-state in each. On any occasion, a plastic system has a ‘repertoire’ of responses 
that it is capable of producing, some of which are conducive to the attainment of the system’s 
goals. And it exhibits a bias toward the goal-conducive elements of its repertoire (Walsh, 2012, p. 
177).  
Note that although the paradigm cases of successful teleological explanation appeal to the 
intentions of an agent, having a goal in Walsh’s intended sense does not presuppose intentionality. 
Non-human organisms and other systems without intentional states can exhibit goal-directed 
behavior just as rational agents do. In fact, Walsh considers many biological subsystems such as 
the endocrine, immune, and thermoregulatory systems to be goal-directed systems, as they involve 
persistent and/or plastic attainment of stable end-states (2015, p. 202).  
 
15 Although Walsh offers a different, non-reductive account of goals—in terms of an interdefineable cluster of 
concepts consisting of goal, affordance, and repertoire—elsewhere (2015, p. 211), in his discussion of teleological 
explanation, he appeals to the system-theoretical notion of goal-directedness as a “natural and observable” feature of 
a system’s dynamics (2015, p. 195).  
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Moreover, it’s worth noting that the invariance relation between a system’s goal xe and a 
means xc to achieving it does not require that the goal state is achieved successfully. The relation 
of counterfactual dependence between xe and xc does not require that they actually occur, but rather 
that there are a range of actual or counterfactual conditions in which xc occurs as a matter of 
regularity in a way that is conducive to xe. To see an example, suppose I have the goal of buying 
sweet lemons, but ultimately fail to buy them because the store runs out of them before I get there. 
Even though my goal state of buying lemons is not actually realized, we can see that it still has an 
invariant relation to my action of going to the market. There are a range of counterfactual 
conditions in which the store does not run out of lemons before I get there, and in which I buy 
lemons. And my behavior in these counterfactual conditions shows persistence and plasticity 
toward the goal of buying lemons such that in each condition I adjust my action in such a way that 
it is conducive to the goal of buying lemons.  
Walsh’s account of teleological explanation is compelling. It offers a plausible view of what 
makes teleological explanation explanatory, and shows how causes and goals explain in the same 
way—namely by uncovering patterns of counterfactual dependence—despite offering distinct 
explanations. More importantly for our purposes, Walsh’s account identifies a kind of regularity 
that has explanatory significance and is empirically observable in an individual system. This 
particular kind of regularity in the modal profile of a goal-directed system will be the core of my 
account of natural goodness. As I will argue in the next section, patterns of purposive invariance 
can replace the generic patterns of regularity in the natural-historical account, and give us an 
alternative account of natural goodness that does not involve a commitment to anti-individualism.  
5 A Modal-Explanatory Account of Natural Goodness  
In a nutshell, my account of natural goodness uses Walsh’s patterns of purposive invariance to 
determine what is characteristic in the life of a living organism without appealing to the natural 
history of its life-form. I argue that whether the contribution of a part or aspect of an organism to 
a good like survival is accidental or characteristic depends on whether there are patterns of 
counterfactual dependence that enable us to explain the part or aspect as a means toward the goal 
of survival. Thus, on my account, the natural good of an organism depends on the patterns of 
purposive invariance observed in the organism’s own modal profile, and not on the generic patterns 
observed across the members of its life-form. 
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Before presenting the account in detail, there is an issue that I need to clarify in relation to 
my use of Walsh’s account to teleological explanation. I mentioned earlier that the notion of goal 
implicit in Walsh’s account can be understood based on the systems-theoretic notion of goal-
directedness. However, since the system-theoretic account is given in causal terms, it characterizes 
any physical system that tends toward some steady state of equilibrium in the right way as a goal-
directed system. As a result, the account extends the concept of goal to many systems that nobody 
would consider to be genuinely goal-directed. As Bedau (1992) has argued, for instance, many 
equilibrium systems such as a damped pendulum or a marble inside a bowl tend toward a steady 
state of rest in a way that meets the criteria of the systems-theoretic account, and yet we do not 
consider such systems to be goal-directed.16 Now, if the system-theoretical approach fails to 
exclude non-goal-directed systems that merely behave as if they were goal-directed, Walsh’s 
account of teleological explanation similarly extends these explanations to systems that merely 
exhibit the behavioral signs of a goal-directed system. So, the modal profile that Walsh calls 
purposive invariance is not a sufficient condition for genuine purposive behavior.17 We may call 
this modal profile perseverance to avoid the implication of genuine purposiveness. What 
perseverance involves is a persistent and/or plastic tendency toward an end-state, which only 
amounts to a necessary condition for purposiveness at best. Thus, perseverance on its own is 
clearly not sufficient for determining standards of natural goodness. Just because a system 
perseveres toward an end-state, it doesn’t follow that it can be evaluated based on whether this 
end-state is achieved. A pendulum whose bob is kept from returning to the state of rest is not 
 
16 Specifying criteria that exclude non-goal-directed equilibrium systems turns out to be a serious problem for 
the systems approach, which has led many to conclude that this approach ultimately fails to differentiate between 
genuine goal-directed systems and systems that merely behave as if they were goal-directed. Bedau (1992), for 
instance, argues that the causal dynamics of a system do not determine whether the system is goal-directed. He 
proposes that a distinctive feature of goal-directed systems is that their behavior is of value to something or someone, 
which is why the systems approach fails to capture goal-directedness in terms of merely causal, quantitative criteria. 
17 As I mentioned earlier, it is not the aim of Walsh’s account of teleological explanation to offer an understanding 
of genuine goal-directedness, but rather to identify the aspects of goal-directedness that make it explanatory. So the 
concern that I am raising here is not necessarily a problem for Walsh’s view. It’s rather a concern about whether we 
can use Walsh’s view regarding teleological explanation as a basis for an account of natural goodness. 
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thereby failing or defective, since there is no value associated with the state of rest to begin with. 
This means that if we are to give an account of natural goodness based on the notion of 
perseverance, we will have to supplement the account with additional criteria that can mark the 
difference between genuinely purposive and non-purposive cases.  
Because of this, it is not the ambition of my account to determine standards of natural 
goodness based on perseverance alone. I merely use the patterns of perseverance to replace the 
patterns of genericity in the natural-historical account. As we saw in section 2, patterns of 
genericity—i.e., the patterns of regularity underlying generic judgments—are not inherently 
evaluative either. Foot and Thompson supplement the criterion of genericity with additional, 
evaluative criteria, which makes the natural-historical account a non-reductive account that needs 
to be coupled with basic general assumptions about the good of living things to issue further 
evaluations. As we will see below, my account of natural goodness is similarly non-reductive, as 
it too involves evaluative criteria. I will argue that my account also enables us to turn general 
plausible assumptions about the good of living things into specific standards of evaluation, and 
explains the relation between these evaluations and empirical observation. Nonetheless, I will 
show that my account does all of this without making any reference to genericity, and therefore 
does not share the problematic anti-individualistic implications of the natural-historical account.   
The Modal-Explanatory Account is as follows:  
For any individual organism x, being/doing/having F is a natural good if and only if:   
(1) Teleology(EXP): If x were to be/do/have F, x’s being/doing/having F would teleologically 
explain H and be teleologically explained by G, where H and G are natural goods in x. 
(2) Independence(EXP): The teleological explanation of F by G and the teleological 
explanation of H by F would be independent of the goods of any entity other than x. 
Note that I have used the subscript (EXP) to indicate that the conditions are defined in terms of 
teleological explanation.  
Let’s look at the components of the account in turn. The first condition captures the idea that 
the natural goods of a living organism are teleologically interconnected. F is a natural good of the 
organism if and only if, on one hand, there is another natural good of the organism, G, such that F 
would be a means toward G, and on the other hand, there is another natural good of the organism, 
H, which would be a means toward F. Much like the condition of Teleology in the natural-
historical account, Teleology(EXP) presupposes a prior, evaluative conception of the life of the 
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organism. Recognizing a natural good of organism x requires presupposing at least some other 
natural goods of x. But here, instead of understanding the means-end relation between the natural 
goods in terms of generic statements featuring the ‘in order to’ clause, this relation is understood 
in terms of teleological explanation and the kind of modal profile that it involves. On my account, 
if P is a means toward Q, then P is teleologically explained by Q, where teleological explanation 
is understood in terms of Walsh’s account discussed earlier. Thus, Teleology(EXP) requires that 
there would be a counterfactual dependence relation of perseverance between F and G and between 
H and F.  
It’s worth noting that the condition expressed in Teleology(EXP) does not require that x 
actually is/does/has F. In other words, F can be a natural good for x even if it is not achieved in x. 
By the same token, G or H can be a natural good for x even if they are not achieved in x. What the 
condition requires is rather that if x were to be/do/have a natural good like F, its being/doing/having 
F would fit in patterns of perseverance involving other natural goods like G and H.18 This is how 
the account allows for the occurrence of natural defect in an organism, i.e., cases where the 
organism lacks something that is a natural good. On the natural-historical account, this possibility 
simply follows from the logic of generic statements: “tigers run fast” and “tigers run fast in order 
to hunt prey” can be true even if a particular tiger is unable to run fast. On the modal-explanatory 
account, the possibility of defect is captured by the consideration that even if x lacks F, it can be 
true that the modal profile of x is such that, on the one hand being/doing/having F would make a 
persistent and/or plastic contribution toward G, and on the other hand H would make a persistent 
and/or plastic toward being/doing/having F. For example, even in a tiger that as a matter of fact 
cannot run fast due to an injury, it can be true that if it had the ability to run fast, this would make 
a persistent and/or plastic contribution toward hunting prey, such that we would teleologically 
explain the tiger’s running fast as a means toward hunting prey. Similarly, it can be true that other 
 
18 These conditions are given with the help of a counterfactual. Here I have left it open how the counterfactual 
should be interpreted. But any theory of counterfactuals could be used to fill in the details of the account. For instance, 
if we use Lewis’s (1973) theory, the condition of Teleology(EXP) would require that some possible world where x 
is/does/has F and this is teleologically explained by G is closer to the actual world than any of those possible worlds 
where x is/does/has F but this is not teleologically explained by G. 
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aspects of the life of such a tiger, like having four legs, would make a persistent and/or plastic 
contribution toward running fast, even if running fast is not actually achieved.  
The second condition, Independence(EXP), captures the idea that evaluations of natural 
goodness are distinct from evaluations of artifacts and crafts in that they do not depend on the 
interests of us or any beneficiaries external to the system. We saw that on the natural-historical 
account this criterion is formulated in terms of whether anyone needs to actually make the relevant 
natural-historical judgments. On the modal-explanatory account, the idea is formulated in terms of 
teleological explanation. In the case of artifacts and crafts, the teleological explanation of a given 
feature or part of the system ultimately goes beyond the system itself. That is because what 
ultimately underwrites the teleological relations that hold between the parts and mechanisms of an 
artifact is the fact that it is a means toward our ends. A car’s carburetor, for instance, can be 
teleologically explained as a means toward the end of mixing air and fuel in the proper air–fuel 
ratio for combustion.19 The mixing of air and fuel is in turn teleologically explained as a means 
toward the combustion of the fuel, which is itself a means toward moving the car. But the 
explanation ultimately depends on what is good for us. What underwrites the status of the moving 
of the car as an end is the fact that it is a means toward our end of transportation. In other words, 
the complete teleological explanation of the carburetor will have to make reference to our goods 
and interests. In contrast, in the case of living organisms, the teleological explanation of the 
system’s parts and processes will be independent of the goods of any entity other than the system 
itself. To use our earlier example, a tiger’s ability to run fast can be explained as a means toward 
the goal of hunting prey. This goal in turn can be teleologically explained in terms of further goods 
such as nutrition and survival. But the chain of teleological relations does not have to go beyond 
the goods of the tiger itself for the explanation to be complete.20 As we saw earlier, the natural 
 
19 Note that the carburetor has the right modal profile for teleological explanation. Under a range of conditions, 
it mixes air and fuel in the ratio that is appropriate for combustion regardless of, for instance, how much fuel is in the 
tank. 
20 The claim here is not about the causal explanations that apply in the case of an organism. The causal 
explanation of an organism’s parts and aspects can very much depend on the goods of external entities—for instance, 
if it is an organism that we have artificially bred to serve interests of our own. The claim is rather that the teleological 
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goods of the organism instantiate teleological relations that form a cycle. So even though each 
natural good is teleologically explained in terms of another natural good, we don’t need to leave 
the cycle of the goods of the organism to complete the explanation.21  
Now we can see how the modal-explanatory account compares to the natural-historical 
account in making evaluations of natural goodness and defect. Consider again Lott’s case of a tiger 
with an unusual arrangement of fur on its face resembling a hunter’s mother’s face. The natural-
historical account explains why this feature is not a natural good by appealing to the fact that it is 
neither characteristic of tigers in general to have it, nor characteristic of this feature to contribute 
to tigers’ survival. In contrast, the modal-explanatory account explains the fact that this feature is 
not a natural good in a very different way, by appealing to the modal profile of the very tiger that 
has the unusual face. Although the arrangement of fur on the face of the tiger happens to make a 
contribution toward survival, this contribution is not part of a persistent and/or plastic pattern of 
contribution toward survival. Neither are there other natural goods in the life of the tiger that 
persevere toward creating that specific arrangement of fur. The relation between the arrangement 
of fur and other natural goods in the life of the tiger is contingent and merely causal. In other 
words, it’s similar to the case of buying sweet lemons as a result of accidentally finding them in 
the store as opposed to going to the store with the goal of buying sweet lemons.  
According to the modal-explanatory account, a tiger’s modal profile also explains why 
certain other features such as the ability to run fast or having night vision are natural goods in the 
tiger’s life. Consider a tiger’s night vision, which contributes to hunting prey and obtaining food. 
In contrast to the unusual arrangement of fur in Lott’s example, the ability to see in the dark can 
be viewed a genuine means toward the good of survival, because the contribution it makes toward 
survival is persistent and plastic. It is not just that it enables the tiger to obtain food in a one-off 
 
explanation of these parts and aspects as means towards the natural goods of the organism is independent of the goods 
of external entities.  
21 Note that this doesn’t require that all the goods of an organism are placed on a single cycle, but rather that 
there is at least one cycle, exclusively consisting of the goods of the organism, that they are part of. Because of this, 
not every natural good of the organism has to be a means toward survival or reproduction in order to be part of a cycle. 
Human character traits that constitute different virtues, for instance, can be part of a cycle of virtuous traits that are 
interdependent without necessarily contributing to survival. 
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case under highly contingent circumstances. There are a range of actual and counterfactual 
conditions in which having night vision would contribute to the tiger’s hunting prey and obtaining 
food. Moreover, there are other parts and aspects of the tiger, such as having more rods than cones 
in their eyes and having a tapetum lucidum (a reflective layer behind the retina), which fit in a 
persistent and plastic pattern of contribution toward creating night vision. In fact, as I explained 
above, the modal-explanatory account has no problem identifying this good in a tiger that actually 
lacks the ability. Even if a tiger’s night vision is compromised due to an injury or a congenital 
problem, it can still be the case if the tiger were to have the ability, this would be a means toward 
the goods of hunting prey and obtaining food. And there would still be other parts and aspects of 
the tiger that persevere toward creating night vision, even if unsuccessfully.22  
Moreover, although the modal-explanatory account allows us to identify natural goods that 
are missing in an organism due to a defect, it does not characterize just any possible feature that 
would be potentially beneficial as naturally good. In the case of a tiger, for instance, having wings 
and the ability to fly might be beneficial and enable the organism to achieve its ends more 
successfully. But this doesn’t mean that this is a natural good in the life of a tiger, or that a tiger 
is defective for not having wings. The modal-explanatory account can explain why a tiger without 
legs is defective while a tiger without wings is not by appealing to the modal profile of an 
individual tiger. If having wings was a natural good in the life of a tiger, there would be other 
aspects of a tiger’s life that persevere toward having wings and would be teleologically explained 
as a means toward this end. But a tiger’s anatomy and morphology simply do not have the right 
modal profile to meet this condition. The parts and aspects of a tiger’s anatomy and morphology 
are best explained as means toward locomotion by walking and running as opposed to flight. 
Finally, note that unlike the natural-historical account, the modal-explanatory account is not 
committed to the idea that all members of a species need to be evaluated based on the same 
standard. It is in principle possible for different individual members to have different modal 
profiles, resulting in different standards of evaluation. To see this, consider again the case of 
Hopper—the goat that has adapted to its condition by developing enlarged hind limbs, a curved 
 
22 Note that the account does not consider F a natural good if no part or aspect of the organism perseveres toward 
F. For instance, if all the parts and aspects of the visual system that distinctively contribute toward night vision are 
missing in a tiger, the account would not characterize night vision as a natural good in such a tiger. 
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spine, and an unusually large neck, enabling it to walk and run by using its hind legs alone. As a 
result of these adjustments, the modal profile of Hopper perseveres toward moving around by 
walking on two legs. It is not that the two legs make a one-off contribution to the goat’s moving 
around under highly contingent circumstances. Rather, due to the goat’s anatomy, having two legs 
fits into a system of locomotion that makes a persistent and plastic contribution toward moving 
with two legs. This is why, on the modal-explanatory account, having two legs can be characterized 
as a natural good in the life of Hopper, even though it might amount to a natural defect in the life 
of other goats. Note that on this account, having four legs is actually not a natural good in the life 
of Hopper, for the same reason that having wings or fins is not a natural good in its life. The modal 
profile of Hopper does not persevere toward having such characteristics and using them toward 
obtaining its goods. The goat’s anatomy is simply not a means toward walking on four legs, just 
as it is not a means toward flying or swimming. It’s rather a means toward walking and hopping 
on two legs, which is why for Hopper natural good consists in having two legs rather than four. 
We may contrast the case of Hopper with a more ordinary goat that has lost two legs in an injury 
or is born with two legs due to a congenital condition without having been able to adjust to having 
two legs during development. Such a goat does not have enlarged hind limbs or a curved spite, and 
so is not capable of hopping on two legs. Its modal profile actually perseveres toward having four 
legs, even though it only has two. Unlike Hopper, such a goat is defective in that it fails to have 
four legs, because what is naturally good in its life is having four legs rather than two.   
Thus, the modal-explanatory account makes the same evaluations as the natural-historical 
account in cases where these evaluations are intuitively plausible. Yet it makes different 
evaluations in the case of individuals with uniquely adaptive adjustments where the natural-
historical account issues the wrong assessment due to its commitment to anti-individualism. In 
other words, what we have here is a viable alternative to the natural-historical account that does 
not share its problematic, anti-individualistic implications. 
6 Concluding Remarks: Natural Goodness without Anti-Individualism 
I started this paper by highlighting the distinction between the general concept of natural goodness 
and the specific, natural-historical conception of this concept implicit in Foot and Thompson’s 
account. I argued that the natural-historical account is anti-individualistic and issues implausible 
evaluations of individuals with uniquely adaptive adjustments. I then argued that the modal-
31 
 
explanatory account is a viable alternative to the natural-historical account that makes intuitively 
plausible evaluations even in the case of such individuals.  
It’s worth noting that the modal-explanatory account also issues a more intuitively plausible 
verdict in Swampman-style cases. As we saw earlier, the natural-historical account implies that 
upon discovering Swampman’s ontogeny, we can exclude the possibility that it’s a living thing 
and we can treat it as if it has no natural good or welfare. In contrast, the modal-explanatory 
account allows for the possibility that Swampman could be a living thing and subject to evaluations 
of natural goodness. Unlike the natural-historical account, this account has the resources to explain 
why in the case of Thompson’s swamp double its molecular equivalents of human arms are really 
arms and not deformed wings. Since the creature is a molecule-by-molecule replica of a human, 
its modal profile is exactly like that of a human. So the explanation of its parts and aspects will be 
exactly the same: its molecular equivalents of human arms are arms rather than wings, because its 
anatomy and structure persevere toward using arms rather than wings.  
Not only does the modal-explanatory account give an intuitive assessment of the cases 
discussed above, it also has desirable implications regarding our understanding of human form in 
particular. On one hand, the account allows for a pluralistic conception of human form, where 
different individual human beings can potentially have different forms that give rise to different 
standards of evaluation. On the other hand, the standard of evaluation for each individual is 
grounded in facts about the individual itself rather than facts about the species the individual 
happens to be born into. This pluralist and individualist conception of human form is desirable for 
many reasons, but a particularly salient one is that it enables us to present a more nuanced view of 
human disability.  
One of the objections raised against Foot’s version of neo-Aristotelian naturalism is that it 
labels the lack of any species-typical ability in human beings as a defect, while it’s not clear at all 
that departure from a species-typical ability necessarily makes a disabled person defective 
(Woodcock, 2006, p. 451). Many philosophers defend a value-neutral view of disability, according 
to which the lack of a physical or mental ability that other people have is a neutral feature that that 
is not in itself bad. Barnes (2014; 2016), for instance, argues that having a disability is a mere 
difference from others. It is a difference that makes you a minority, but it does not necessarily 
make you worse off because of the difference. Defenders of the value-neutral view don’t deny that 
having a disability—in the sense of lacking an ability possessed by ‘normal’ people—can involve 
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the loss of some goods or that it can ultimately result in being worse off. But they argue that the 
relation between having the disability and being worse off is highly contingent and socially 
constructed. Moreover, they argue that precisely what makes you lose out on some goods can allow 
you to participate in other goods that are unique to disability. It might be true, for instance, that 
the ability to hear is a good that deaf people lack. But there are other goods, such as the unique 
experience of a signed language as first language, which deaf people enjoy instead.23  
The natural-historical account makes it difficult to accommodate such a view of disability 
due to its commitment to the idea that the standards of goodness are necessarily shared across the 
members of a life-form. Consider a person with a disability such as deafness from birth, who is 
perfectly happy as a deaf person, embraces being deaf, and participates in the unique set of goods 
that come with this identity. On the natural-historical account, lacking the ability to hear amounts 
to a defect, because “humans have a sense of hearing” is, quite plausibly, a true natural-historical 
judgment. Yet, it’s not obvious that the deaf person in our example should be viewed as naturally 
defective merely because “humans have a sense of hearing”. In contrast to the natural-historical 
account, the modal-explanatory account can avoid systematically treating every case of deafness 
as a defect, because on this account the basis for evaluation is the modal profile of the individual 
person. And it’s at least in principle possible for the physical and social aspects of the life of a deaf 
person to be arranged in such a way that deafness does not constitute a natural defect in their life. 
Of course, this is merely scratching the surface on the topic of disability and human form. I have 
neither offered a conclusive defense of the value-neutral view of disability, nor shown that the 
natural-historical account has no way of accommodating such a view. I have only presented a few 
rudimentary considerations to illustrate how the fact that the modal-explanatory account is 
consistent with individualism can work in its favor when it comes to offering an understanding of 
human form.  
In summary, I have offered an alternative basis for evaluations of natural goodness that 
avoids at least one problematic aspect of Foot and Thompson’s paradigmatic account. On my 
account, what determines evaluations of natural goodness are the patterns of counterfactual 
 
23 In fact, over the last few decades, disability rights activists have advocated an affirmative conception of 
disability (Swain & French, 2000), according to which disability is a positive social identity that can be actively 
embraced and celebrated. 
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dependence among the parts and aspects of an organism that underwrite teleological explanations 
of these parts and aspects. Instead of relying on generic judgments about a species, this account 
grounds the distinction between goodness and defect in an explanatorily significant type of modal 
profile that is instantiated in an individual organism. Thus, what I have offered is an account of 
natural goodness that is consistent with individualism and in line with the diversity and plasticity 
that is manifest everywhere in realm of living things.  
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